Adoption Couples v. Baby Girl , 570 US ___ (2013), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court that states that parts of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) do not apply to native American biological father (India) who is not a child guardian of India. The court ruled that the procedure required by ICWA to terminate parental rights did not apply when the child never lived with the father. In addition, the requirement to make an extra effort to preserve the Indian family also does not apply, as well as the preferred placement of children in other Indian families is required when no other party is officially seeking to adopt the child.
In 2009, a couple from South Carolina, Matthew and Melanie Capobianco, attempted to adopt a child whose father, Dusten Brown, was a registered Cherokee Nation member and his mother, Christina Maldonado, was dominated by Hispanics. Brown fought an adoption on the grounds that he was not properly notified in accordance with ICWA, and won both in court and on appeal to the High Court of South Carolina, and in December 2011, the father was granted custody of the child. The case received widespread coverage in the national media, and prompted calls for Congress to review and amend the 1978 law.
In October 2012, the adoptive couple petitioned to the United States Supreme Court to review the case. In January 2013, the court granted certiorari and heard the case in April. In June, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision, stating that a non-custodial father has no rights under the ICWA, and sent the case back to the South Carolina court for further examination of the matter. In July 2013, a South Carolina district court completed the adoption of the child to an adoptive partner, but this was banned in August by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The stay was lifted in September 2013, and the child was submitted to Capobiancos in the same month.
Video Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
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Indian Child Welfare Act
Before the adoption of ICWA in 1978, Indian children were often forced out of their homes and housed in Native American boarding schools or in non-Indian orphanages and foster homes. Studies conducted in 1969 and in 1974 show that as many as 25 to 35 percent of tribal children are being excluded from their homes, and consequently from tribal cultures. Testimony in the House Committee for Interior and Insular Affairs shows that in some states, the per capita rate of Indian children in care is almost 16 times higher than non-Indian levels. In some cases, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) pays the states to remove tribal children and puts them with non-Indian families and religious groups. Congress ruled that if Indian children continue to be excluded from Indian homes at this level, tribal survival would be threatened and state that tribal stability is as important as the best interests of the child. One factor in this assessment is that, due to differences in culture, what is in the best interest of a non-Indian child is not always what is in the best interest of an Indian child, mainly due to the influence of family extension and tribal relations. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was enacted in 1978 to protect Indians and their children.
ICWA applies to "Indian children", defined as "any unmarried person under the age of eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) qualifies for membership in an Indian tribe and is a biological child of Indian tribesmen. "In addition, in the case of adoption of an Indian child on a voluntary basis, courts must follow specific guidelines for Indian-born parents to set aside their parental rights or stop them. ICWA provides that to waive parental rights, Indian parents must:
- do it in writing,
- do it before the judge,
- that should state that the parent understands his actions,
- understand spoken English or have available translators, and
- the release can not be done before ten days after child's birth.
Indian parents can also withdraw their consent to be adopted anytime before the final order, or within two years of final order if their consent is obtained through fraud or under pressure. If forced termination occurs, it should be "supported by evidence beyond reasonable doubt." When the consent is withdrawn or if the ICWA procedure is not followed, the Indian child must be immediately returned to the Indian parent.
Tribal rights are also covered by the law. Tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction for cases arising on Indian reservations and concurrent jurisdiction elsewhere. This case may be removed from a state court to a tribal court at the request of a tribe unless one of the parents of an Indian child objected. In any case, the tribe has the right to intervene in legal proceedings and act to protect the rights of the child's tribal rights.
Case history
Dusten Brown is a member of the Cherokee Nation. Brown served in the United States Army at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Christina Maldonado is a single non-Indian mother of two. Brown and Maldonado were engaged to marry in December 2008, and Maldonado informed Brown that she was pregnant in January 2009. After learning that Maldonado was pregnant, Brown began to urge her to marry and marry, and refused to provide any financial support. until after both married. In May 2009, Maldonado broke off an engagement with a text message and cut off all communication with Brown. In June, Maldonado sent a text message to Brown asking if he would rather pay child support or relinquish custody. Brown responded by text message that he waived his rights. No child support allowances exist today. In addition, while legislation varies from state to state, it is generally impossible for parents, men or women, to surrender their parent's rights without trial to determine the best interests of the child. A father can not end custody with a contract, let alone in a more informal way (such as through text messages).
A few months before the birth of a baby, Maldonado began working with an adoption lawyer to place a child with Matthew Capobianco and Melanie Duncan Capobianco from James Island, South Carolina. The adoptive partner provided financial support to Maldanado during her pregnancy and attended the birth of Baby Girl, where her adoptive father cut the umbilical cord. Although Oklahoma law requires that the Indians be notified that an Indian child should be adopted, Maldonado's lawyer misspelled Brown's name and gave the wrong birth date. As a result, the tribe was not informed of the adopted adoption. After receiving permission from the Oklahoma authorities, partly based on child identification as Hispanic rather than Native American, Capobiancos took the boy to South Carolina.
Four months after the birth of the child and just days before being placed in Iraq, Brown was presented with notices of adopted adoption. Brown signed the document, believing that he waived the right to Maldonado. Brown, as soon as he realized what he had signed, immediately tried to retrieve the documents, and after that failed, contacted the General Advocate Judge at Fort Sill for help. Seven days after being informed of the adoption proposed by Capobiancos, Brown earned a live adoption process under the Civil Servicemembers Assistance Act and he deployed with the Army unit to Iraq.
Trial trial
The adoption case was heard at Charleston County Family Court in September 2011. Brown was fighting for adoption, and the Cherokee Nation intervened as a party in its own right in this case. The court rejected Capobianco's request to adopt the child, and ordered that the child be returned to Brown as a biological father. Under South Carolina law, a father's parents' rights expire when he does not provide pre-natal support or is not involved with the child immediately after birth. The court noted, however, that the ICWA preceded state law. On 25 November 2011, the court issued a verdict, stating that:
- ICWA is applied and unconstitutional,
- "Existing Indian Family" exceptions can not be applied in this case,
- Brown does not approve of termination of custody or adoption of his child, and
- Capobiancos failed to show with clear and convincing evidence that Brown's parents' rights should be stopped.
On December 31, 2011, Capobiancos redirected the child to Brown in accordance with a court order. The Capobiancos then appealed to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Supreme State Court
Supreme Court judge Jean H. Toal presented court opinions on July 26, 2012. The five court members divided 3-2, with Judge Costa M. Pleicones and Donald W. Beatty joined the majority opinion, while Judge John W. Kittredge, joined Justice Kaye Mr. Hearn, does not agree. The argument resolved three issues: Firstly, whether Capobiancos had removed the kid from Oklahoma improperly; Secondly, whether state law or ICWA determines the status of Brown as a parent; and thirdly, whether Capobianco meets their burden of proof to end the rights of parents from Brown.
Toal noted that Capobiancos was right that the transfer of children from Oklahoma did not create an environment that was not safe for children, but they were wrong in legal matters. If Oklahoma were properly informed that this was an Indian child, the Cherokees would be warned, and the interests of the child as tribal members would be protected. He noted that at this point, the case was right before the court, and began to deal with the second problem.
The Capobiancos argues that it takes more than just biology to apply for ICWA provisions, and according to South Carolina law, a father should not only stay with the mother for a period of six months before the birth of a child but also contribute to pregnancy. related costs to have a father right. However, the Court determined that the ICWA is not subject to state law, and the court decides rightly that ICWA gives Indian fathers a greater right than state law.
Toal then turned to the last problem, the court's refusal to end Brown's parents' rights. Capobiancos can not demonstrate that Brown has agreed to approve such adoption. The Court noted that ICWA established clear procedural guidelines and Capobianco did not meet these requirements. Capobiancos also failed to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that Brown's parents' rights should be stopped. Under ICWA, before terminating the rights of Indian parents to Indian children, parties seeking to end parental rights "must satisfy the courts that active efforts have been made to provide repair services and rehabilitation programs designed to prevent the breakup of Indian families and that efforts this proved unsuccessful. "The court noted that Capobianco made no attempt to comply with the requirements of this federal law, but actively tried to prevent the father from getting custody since the child was four months old.
The court then discusses the best interests of the child. Toal said, quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield , "If the best interests of an Indian child are at stake, our investigation into the child's best interests must also take into account his status as an Indian, and therefore we should also investigate whether his placement is in the best interest of the Indian child , "that this is" based on the basic assumption that it is in the best interests of the Indian child whose ties to the tribe are protected. "Toal states that the child's best interest is to be with his father, who also maintains his tribal affiliation.
Finally, Toal discusses the ICWA placement requirements, which require that placement of preferences be given, in this order, to: 1) other members of the child's family, 2) other members of the children's tribe, and 3) other Indian families. The court declared that neither Maldonado nor Capobiancos intended to abide by the law, and that Capobianco could not claim that the termination of the ties formed by the child by Capobianco was the reason for disregarding the law.
The court affirmed the decision of the County Charleston Family Court in returning an Indian child to his father, and reiterated that the ICWA precedes the state law in terminating parental rights to Indian parents.
Dissent
Judge John W. Kittredge, joined Justice Kaye G. Hearn, disagreed. Kittredge argues that state standards for the best interests of children must defeat the people of ICWA, and conclude that the court judges are mistaken in their findings on facts. He noted that Brown had revenues of approximately $ 23,000 in 2010, paid nothing to help with pre-natal costs, and has indicated that he has no intention of doing so. In addition, Kittredge stated that the record reflects that Maldonado informs both adoption and adoption lawyers of the Cherokee child inheritance, but the notice to the tribe does not have the correct identifier information for the father. At the time of birth of the child, Capobiancos is present, and Matt Capobianco cuts the umbilical cord.
Kittredge later evaluated ICWA, noting that South Carolina's law does not allow a Brown's father to oppose adoption. Brown recognizes paternity, and DNA tests convincingly prove that he is a biological father. Because Brown meets the definition of Indian parents, ICWA applies to this case. Even if Brown does not recognize paternity, the boy is still Indian and federal law will apply. However, Kittredge later stated that although ICWA is implemented, Congress does not intend ICWA to replace state laws relating to the best interests of the child.
Kittredge concludes that Brown has "abandoned" his son and therefore can not follow the adoption contest. He notes that Capobiancos provides children with loving and stable homes. Eventually, he will decide that Brown's parental termination is in the child's best interest, and will reverse court decisions.
Maps Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
Supreme Court
Arguments
After the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to repeat the case, Capobiancos petitioned with the United States Supreme Court for a certiorari warrant. Seven entities filed the amici curiae brief with the Supreme Court to support the case. These include the amictions briefed by two former United States Attorney General Paul Clement on behalf of the guardian of the litem , and Greg Garre on behalf of the biological mother, suggesting that the Same Protection Clause requires strict application. supervision of ICWA-based placement preferences. The American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, the National Council for Adoption, the California State Association and the Center for Adoption Policy are also among those who submit reports.
On January 4, 2013, the Court granted certiorari and agreed to hear the case. This is only the second time that cases involving ICWA have been granted a review by the US Supreme Court, Holyfield being the first. On April 1, 2013, the court decided to allow some amici to participate in the oral argument and divide the allowable time for the oral argument as follows: 20 minutes for the applicant, 10 minutes for Guardian ad Litem respondents, 20 minutes for the respondent. , and 10 minutes for General Attorney. Brown is represented by Charles Rothfeld, who is a director at the Yale Law School Supreme Court Clinic and litigator of the Supreme Court with Washington, D.C., the office of international law firm Mayer Brown. The Cherokee nation is represented by Carter Phillips of Sidley Austin, LLP. The Capobiancos is represented by Lisa Blatt and Mark Fiddler. Blatt led the Appeals and Supreme Court practices with the international law firm Arnold & amp; Porter. Fiddler is a registered Native American lawyer and founder of the Child Welfare Legal Center of India. On an oral argument on April 16, US Deputy Attorney Edwin Kneedler also appeared, as a friend of the Birth Father.
Issues to the courts are: (1) Can non-custodial parents be able to use the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 USC Ã,§Ã,§ 1901-63, to block the voluntary adoption and legitimate initiated by non-Indian parents under state law, and (2) does ICWA define "parents" in 25 USC Ã,§ 1903 (9) to include unmarried biological fathers who have not complied with the rule of law state to achieve legal status as a parent. "
Three parties filed a merit report: Capobianco as the applicant, and Brown and the Cherokee Nation as respondents. 32 different amici curiae examinations were filed by debating the merits of the case. Nine support the reversal and the rest, including the US Department of Justice, support the general respondents and/or affirmations.
Court Opinion
On June 25, the Court turned and retreated, with Judge Samuel Alito writing for the five majorities of justice. Alito started by observing that Baby Girl "is classified as Indian because he is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee." Alito went on to reject the ICWA reading by a lower court, arguing it would discourage adoptive couples and leave "vulnerable Indian children at a unique disadvantage in finding a permanent and loving home."
Alito noted that the three provisions of ICWA are relevant to the case, Ã,§ 1912 (f), Ã,§ 1912 (d), and Ã,§ 1915 (a). He also noted it was undeniable under South Carolina's law that Brown would not be able to resist adoption. Alito states that the high standards required under Ã,§ 1912 (f) do not apply when the parent concerned has never had custody of the child, focusing on the phrase "continued detention" in the law. Alito goes on to say that Ã, § 1912 (d) does not require remedial work done when parents do not have custody. Since Brown has never had any physical or legal custody, no remedial efforts are required. Finally, Ã, § 1915 (a) does not prevent non-Indian couples from adopting when no person or body is formally selected to try to adopt the child. To discover otherwise, Alito concluded, would allow Brown to "play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to rule out the mother's decision and the best interests of the child."
Concurrent opinion
Justice Thomas
Judge Clarence Thomas gave a concrete opinion. Thomas believes that the canon of constitutional avoidance requires the results achieved by the majority. Contrary to the fact that there is no constitutional authority for Congress to enforce ICWA, Thomas disagrees with a precedent The congressional court has a "complete power" over Indian affairs and reads the Indian Trade Clause applicable only to tribal trade relations. Because the adoption of ICWA for adoption would be unconstitutional, and the outcome of the majority avoids this problem, Thomas agrees with the majority.
Justice Breyer
Judge Stephen Breyer also issued a very short concrete opinion. Breyer states that because ICWA does not discuss how to treat an absent father, the Court's decision may be too broad. He also noted that the order of preferential placement required under Ã,§ 1915 (a) may be changed by a tribe under Ã,§ 1915 (c) and the tribe could, by resolution, give the father an absent place in the preferential placement.
Disagreements
Justice Scalia
Judge Antonin Scalia issued a very short opinion. Scalia notes that, when he joined Sotomayor's opinion, he disagreed with his opinion that here "literal might be gripping meaning". He went on to say "further custody" could refer to "future custody" - in other words, even if the biological father has no child custody in the past, he can have it in the future, and therefore USC à , §1912 (f) will remain in effect. Scalia also notes that biological parents also have legal rights and there is no reason in law or policy to disburse those rights.
Justice Sotomayor
Judge Sonia Sotomayor, joined Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Elena Kagan, and, in part, Scalia, disagreed with the majority opinion. Noting that the majority seem to consider the preference of Indian placement "unwise", he writes this does not licens the Court "to interpret the law with a view to avoiding the very consequences that Congress expressly attempts to manifest."
Sotomayor reasoned that the majority disregarded the logical structure of the ICWA and adopted the "textual retreat reading" by starting his analysis with the final clause Ã,§1912 (f). Sotomayor states that the "continued detention" in Ã, § 1912 (f) is "the most readable to refer in general to the continuation of parent-child relationships held by ICWA's" parents "with their children." He also stated that even a non-custodial father-son relationship is a "family" for the purposes of Ã,§ 1912 (d) and therefore efforts should be made to prevent his separation. He states that the majority change the law "upside down" to achieve their results. Instead of giving an Indian-born father an "undeserved fortune", Sotomayor argues that Congress only provides the rights of patriarchs that have been enjoyed in several states. Regardless of the laws of each state, Sotomayor thinks the majority read ICWA as "scheme little by little illogical".
In response to majority advice that his reading avoided "equal protection issues", Sotomayor noted that the Court's precedent has long maintained that Indian tribal membership is not a prohibited race classification. He went on to criticize "the majority of repeated, unnecessary analytic references" to the composition of Baby Girl ancestors. Finally, Sotomayor states that the majority ignore the main objectives of the ICWA in its interpretation of Ã, § 1915 (a), and notes that nothing prevents the grandparents from applying for adopting children. He noted that it is not in opinion that mandates the return of the child to Capobianco.
Next development
Media coverage
Before the Supreme Court decision
Coverage in mainstream media is vast. Charleston's Post and Courier runs a series of articles on the case, and the news is picked up by other media. These include local television stations, distant television stations, Cable News Network (CNN), Fox News Channels, national magazines, US. News , and New York Times . In addition, Dr. Phil McGraw presented Capobiancos on his television show in an episode that aired on October 18, 2012. The event soon sparked controversy, with some Indian newspapers and internet news sources calling for a boycott of the show for what they expected. is a one-sided attack on Native Americans. It is also suspected that the mainstream media has been spreading misinformation and misrepresentation that describes Capobianco in good light and Brown in a bad light.
Terry Cross of the National Indian Child Welfare Association (NICWA) commented that despite all the negative pressures, ICWA is needed to protect Indian children from having tribal rights taken from them. He noted that the failure to comply with ICWA is what caused controversy in this case. The ICWA writer, Sen. Jim Abourezk, originally stated that this was "something completely different from what we meant at the time" but two weeks later said that the main purpose of the law was to ensure that the tribes had a chance to signed on the adoption of tribal children.
Post-opinion
After the Supreme Court decision, most media stated that Capobiancos won the case, although some noted correctly that they did not obtain custody, or received an adoption order. Some noted that even with that decision, the return of the child to Capobiancos was not "conquered before" and that the case should return to the state court of South Carolina for additional checks.
Social media
This case received a lot of coverage on social media. A friend of Melanie Duncan Capobianco, Jessica Munday, is a publicist who has previously done contract work for Melanie Duncan, MST Services [Multisystemic Therapy] in South Carolina. Munday embarked on a "Save Veronica" campaign aimed at gathering grassroots support for the couple's efforts to overturn the Charleston Family Court and South Carolina Supreme Court ruling. Munday, who runs the marketing firm Trio Solutions Inc. [TRIO] in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, is responsible for making this case famous based on at least one source. The response from the Native American community shows irony in the campaign, with an editorial cartoon depicting "Veronica" confusing a campaign to save her (Indian child) from another Indian. In addition, a movement that supports Dusten Brown and Cherokee, "Stand Our Ground," says that the Baby Veronica case has been a powerful example of systemic problems in the adoption industry and has encouraged adoption reform. The Stand Our Ground started on Facebook and then swelled in protests and rallies in several states.
Legal development
Maldonado filed a lawsuit in the South Carolina District Court on July 24, 2013, requesting that ICWA be declared unconstitutional. On July 31, 2013, Capobianco officially adopted the boy. Along with the South Carolina court completing the adoption, the Rights of American Rights Fund filed a civil rights lawsuit in US District Court on behalf of the child, stating that her rights have been violated by the South Carolina court. In addition, a South Carolina court order can not be enforced in Oklahoma without Oklahoma court approval, and Brown declares that he will fight orders in Oklahoma, with the help of the Cherokee Nation. Before the adoption of South Carolina was being finalized, the Cherokee District Court granted temporary pardon to Brown's wife and parents while Brown was in off-state military training. At the same time, a South Carolina judge ordered Brown to immediately surrender the boy to Capobiancos, whom the Cherokee representatives said was impossible while Brown was in military service.
On August 30, 2013, the Oklahoma Supreme Court remained under a district court order for the child to be immediately transferred from captive Brown to Capobianco. The Capobiancos had a court-ordered visit with the girl in Oklahoma, while the Brown family celebrated the girl's fourth birthday at a party on September 15th. Court mediation trial ordered took place between Browns and Capobiancos between September 16 and September 20, but failed to produce a resolution. The Oklahoma Supreme Court raised its stay from district court orders on September 23, 2013, clearing the way for child custody to be returned to Capobianco. The girl was handed over to her adoptive parents on the night of September 23, 2013. On September 25, 2013, the Charleston County Family Court started the humiliation process against Brown and the Cherokee Nation for detaining Veronica in the face of South Carolina's adoption decision. , which was completed in July. Both sides can face financial sanctions that could include living costs and legal costs for Capobianco during the period in which Brown and the State of Cherokee allegedly insulted the court. In October 2013, Brown announced that he dropped a plea to give his daughter a chance on a normal life.
In November 2013, Matt and Melanie Capobianco filed a lawsuit in Nowata County, Oklahoma, demanding more than $ 1 million in court fees, accrued during their prisoner battle. The suit is against Veronica's biological father, Dusten Brown, and Cherokee Nation. The Cherokee nation issued a strong response, saying "it is irresponsible to pay the fees and fees for Capobiancos because of the eleventh Amendment's immunity from his suit without strict approval." The Cherokees also "clarify the displeasure of the tribe with the appearance of highly visible public media, interviews and fundraising schemes during the same time in which all parties are under South Carolina law."
References
Note
External links
- Full text of opinion, belonging to Cornell University Law School
- Radiolab: Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (42 minutes) Episode of Radiolab
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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